Federico v. Town of Rowley by District of Massachusetts
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
                                                                                                 
                                  ) 
CARMINE FEDERICO,    )       
       ) 
  Plaintiff,    ) 
       )  Civil Action No. 
  v.     )  15-12360-FDS 
       ) 
TOWN OF ROWLEY and    ) 
MARYBETH WISER,        )   
       ) 
  Defendants.    ) 
       ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON  
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
 
SAYLOR, J.  
 This is an employment dispute.  Plaintiff Carmine Federico has brought this action 
against the Town of Rowley, his former employer, and MaryBeth Wiser, his former supervisor.    
The complaint alleges five claims against both defendants.  The first four claims are 
brought pursuant to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a), and the 
Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 52D, related to time 
that Federico took off work.  Federico contends that defendants interfered with his right to take 
leave under these laws, and that they subsequently terminated him in retaliation for exercising 
his right to take leave.  The fifth claim is for invasion of privacy under Massachusetts law. 
Federico contends that Wiser searched his personal effects without permission during his 
employment.   
Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all claims.  For the following 
reasons, the motion will be granted. 
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I. Factual Background 
The facts are presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, except where otherwise 
noted.  
Carmine Federico began working as the administrative assistant to the superintendent of 
the Rowley Water Department on September 23, 2013.  (Federico Dep. 47).  As an 
administrative assistant, Federico was responsible for providing administrative support to the 
superintendent, including answering the telephone, scheduling appointments, and preparing 
minutes for bi-monthly Board of Water Commissioners meetings.  (Def. Ex. D 3-4).  For nearly a 
year, Federico held that position without incident.  (Federico Dep. 67-68). 
On August 11, 2014, MaryBeth Wiser joined the Rowley Water Department as the new 
superintendent, and became Federico’s direct supervisor.  (Id. at 65).  Wiser and Federico agree 
that for the first few weeks of her tenure, the two enjoyed a “friendly” and professional 
relationship.  (Id. at 67-68; Wiser Dep. 39-40).  
A. Federico’s Leave on September 2, 2014 
On Tuesday, September 2, 2014, Federico took the day off work in order to care for his 
elderly mother.  (Federico Dep. 77).1  At that point, Federico had not worked for the Town for 
one year, and therefore did not have any right to FMLA-protected leave.   
That morning, nine inmates from the Lawrence jail arrived at the Rowley Water 
Department to perform painting work as part of an ongoing work-release program.  (Id. at 88; 
Wiser Dep. 42-43).  The inmates could not be put to work immediately because the Water 
Department lacked the necessary supplies.  (Wiser Dep. 42-44).  The Town contends that it was 
Federico’s responsibility to prepare for and direct the inmates’ work, and that he knew or should 
                                                          
1 September 2 was the day after Labor Day.  Federico did not take his mother to any medical appointments 
that day; instead, he helped her out around the house.  (Federico Dep. 87). 
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have known that the inmates would arrive on September 2.  Federico, however, disputes that 
contention.  (Id. at 42-44; Federico Dep. 89-90).   
Wiser called Federico once or twice over the course of the day and sent him one or two 
text messages concerning the waiting inmates.  (Federico Dep. 93-94).2  According to Federico, 
Wiser’s messages were difficult to understand due to a bad connection, but from what Federico 
could understand, Wiser sounded “very overwhelmed,” “distraught and lost,” and “irate about 
something.”  (Id. at 94).  Federico contends that he returned Wiser’s calls, but couldn’t get 
through.  (Id.).  Failing to get in touch with Federico, Wiser went to Walmart to get the missing 
supplies.  (Wiser Dep. 44).   
B. The Events of September 9 to 23, 2014 
Federico contends that after that day, Wiser’s attitude toward him changed, becoming 
hostile and condescending.  (Federico Dep. 100, 108).  He contends that Wiser asked him to 
perform personal and demeaning tasks, such as cleaning dog feces and cigarette ashes from her 
car.  (Id. at 100).  Wiser denies that her attitude and disposition toward Federico changed after 
September 3, and denies that she asked Federico to perform personal favors for her.  (Wiser Dep. 
51-52).  
On September 9 or 10, 2014, Wiser met with Federico after she “had noticed that [his] 
job performance was poor.”  (Id. at 100).  After the meeting, Wiser sent Federico a memorandum 
                                                          
2 There are material inconsistencies between Federico’s deposition testimony and his affidavit as to that 
issue.  In his deposition, Federico testified that Wiser called one or two times and texted one or two times.  (Federico 
Dep. 93-94).  He repeatedly testified that he could not recall the substance of any of his conversations with Wiser, if 
there were any, and that he could not recall the substance of text messages.  (Id.)  When asked whether Wiser left a 
message, he stated, “I don’t recall. It’s been a while so I don’t recall, but I know there was some type of 
communication going on.”  (Id. at 96).  When asked “Did you ever text her that day?” he responded, “No, I don’t 
think so, not to my knowledge.”  (Id. at 94).  In contrast, Federico’s affidavit states that “Ms. Wiser repeatedly 
called, texted and left voice mail messages for me and ignored my responses that I needed to tend to my mother.”  
(Federico Aff. ¶ 8).  For the reasons set forth in a separate memorandum and order, the relevant portion in the 
affidavit will be struck.  See Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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to follow up on the meeting and to spell out his duties and responsibilities in detail.  (Def. Ex. 
D).  The memorandum, among other things, directed Federico to limit personal telephone calls 
during work hours, to refrain from taking work home, and to prepare minutes the day after each 
Board of Water Commissioners meeting is held.  (Id. ¶¶ 17, 26, 2, 19).   
By Friday, September 19, Federico had not yet completed six sets of minutes.  (Wiser 
Dep. 73).  That day, Wiser instructed Federico to put all other work aside and complete the 
missing minutes by September 23.  (Def. Ex. E).  That timeline would allow Federico to work on 
the minutes all day on September 22.  (Id.).  Wiser also instructed Federico not to take work 
home.  (Id.).  Federico failed to produce the missing minutes by Wiser’s deadline, and continued 
to take work home despite Wiser’s directive.  (Federico Dep. 235) 
On Monday, September 22, Federico arrived at work around 7:00 a.m., dropped his 
briefcase on his desk, and briefly left the office to use the men’s room and punch in.  (Federico 
Dep. 23).  His briefcase contained notes he had prepared for meeting minutes, prescription 
medications, his notary public seal, and his wallet.  (Id. at 15-21).  The parties dispute what 
happened next.  Federico contends that he returned to find his briefcase in disarray, and 
concluded that Wiser must have rummaged through his papers while he was away from his desk.  
(Id. at 17-18).  Wiser contends that she did not examine the contents of the briefcase, but instead 
took photographs of work-related papers visible in the open bag.  (Wiser Dep. 89-91).   
On Tuesday, September 23, Wiser held a meeting at the Water Department office with 
Federico, Ron Keefe, the union representative, and Amy Lydon, the Assistant Town 
Administrator, to discuss Federico’s job performance.  (Def. SMF ¶ 46).  The attendees 
discussed the status of the incomplete Board minutes, the manner in which Federico took 
telephone messages, and the charge that Federico was taking work home with him.  (Wiser Dep. 
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98).  When discussing the prohibition on working from home, Wiser stated that she had seen 
work papers in Federico’s briefcase and that she had taken photographs of the papers.  (Federico 
Dep. 17).  Wiser held up her cellular telephone which contained the photographs, but did not 
show them to anyone at the meeting.  (Id. at 21-22; Def. SMF ¶ 51; Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 51).   
At about 11:45 a.m., Wiser asked Federico to produce the minutes that he had completed 
to that point.  (Def. SMF ¶ 54).  Federico did not produce anything.  Instead, he stated that he 
thought someone must have deleted the drafts.  (Id. ¶ 55).  At approximately 11:45 a.m., he 
stated that he was going home sick and that he had recorded the meeting with his cellular 
telephone.  (Id. ¶¶ 54-55).  Federico then left the office.   
Federico never returned to work at the Water Department.  (Id. ¶ 56).  As of September 
23, 2014, he had worked at the Water Department for exactly one year.  He thus became eligible 
for FMLA-protected leave on the day he left. 
C. Post-Employment Investigation of Federico’s Internet Use 
On September 24, 2014, Water Department staff reviewed Federico’s work computer and 
collected internet browsing history and e-mails sent to and from Federico’s work e-mail.  
(Summit Dep. 10-11).  The Town contends that the initial reason for investigating Federico’s 
computer after his departure was to try to find the missing Board minutes.  (Eagan Dep. 28).   
The browsing history on Federico’s computer revealed that he had spent an enormous 
amount of time at work viewing websites, bulletin boards, and videos, and sending e-mails that 
were not work-related.  Among other things, he viewed thousands of advertisements for escort 
services and other sexually explicit advertisements and websites.  (Def. Ex. I; Federico Dep. 94).  
He also watched dozens of hours of episodes of the television show Hogan’s Heroes during 
work hours.  (Def. Ex. I). 
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The paper printout of Federico’s Internet browsing history for the three-month period 
between June 26 and September 22, 2014, takes up 642 pages of single-spaced text.  (Ex. I).  A 
few examples will illustrate how he spent most of each work day. 
As noted, on September 9 or 10, Wiser met with Federico after noticing that his work 
performance was poor.  On the previous day, September 8, Federico first accessed the internet at 
7:00 a.m. by logging on to “Free Music Online – Internet Radio – Jango.”  (Ex. I-10 at 971).  He 
then spent half an hour logging on to what appears to be private e-mail accounts at Hotmail.com 
and Yahoo.com.  (Id. at 971-72).  At 7:29 a.m., he began looking at advertisements on 
Craigslist.com and Backpage.com.3  At 7:30 a.m., he began to view explicit advertisements for 
casual sexual encounters.  (Id. at 972).  He continued to look at ads for sexual encounters, 
websites, and his personal e-mail almost continuously until 11:50 a.m.  (Id. at 987).4  The records 
of his Internet activity for that morning alone—from 7:30 a.m. to 11:50 a.m.—take up more than 
17 single-spaced pages of the record.  (Id. at 972-87).  At 12:15 p.m., he opened an episode of 
Hogan’s Heroes on YouTube, and presumably began watching it at his desk.  There was no 
Internet activity for the next two hours.  At 2:37 p.m., he resumed looking at ads for casual 
sexual encounters and his personal e-mail accounts.  (Id. at 987).  At 3:24 p.m., the Internet 
activity ended.  (Id. at 991).  The internet history for the 47-minute period between 2:37 p.m. and 
3:24 p.m. is more than four pages long.  (Id. at 987-91).        
As also noted, on Friday, September 19, Wiser instructed Federico to put all other work 
aside in order to complete the missing Board minutes.  The internet records for the previous day, 
                                                          
3 Backpage.com is a website that publishes classified advertisements for local escort services, among other 
things.  See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016). 
   
4 The advertisements included such titles as “Methuen slut,” “Daddy, where are you?,” “Slim young beauty 
catering to your needs,” and “Cute discreet white woman looking for a hookup.”  (Id. at 972-87). 
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September 18, are of a similar nature to those described above.  (Id. at 1021-23).  Although he 
viewed fewer sexual encounter advertisements that day, he streamed seven separate episodes of 
Hogan’s Heroes.  (Id.).  On September 19, there were no searches of ads for sexual encounters, 
but he did watch one episode of Hogan’s Heroes.  (Id. at 1024).  September 20 and 21 were a 
Saturday and Sunday, respectively, and there was no Internet activity that day.  
On Monday, September 22, 2014—the day of the alleged briefcase search, and the day he 
was supposed to be finishing the six sets of minutes—Federico began using the internet from his 
work computer at 7:07 a.m., seven minutes into the workday.  (Def. Ex. I-10).  At 7:07, he 
opened three websites simultaneously:  one for an episode of Hogan’s Heroes on YouTube, one 
entitled “Free Music Online,” and one entitled “Water Commissioners’ Meeting recorded July 15 
- Rowley Community Media.”  (Id. at 1024).  At 7:28 a.m., Federico opened Backpage.com.  (Id. 
at 1025).  While on the Backpage website, he visited advertisements for escorts with titles such 
as “NOTHING *SWEET* LIKE PETITE (new pics!)” and “Fresh meat in town 
YOUNG_FUN_SPONTANEOUS.”  (Id.).  At 7:50 a.m., he opened a new episode of Hogan’s 
Heroes.  (Id. at 1025).  He opened three additional episodes at 8:24 a.m., 8:52 a.m., and 9:45 a.m.  
(Id.).  At 9:56 a.m., he visited the “Casual Encounters” section of Craigslist.com.  (Id.).  Between 
9:56 a.m. and 10:06 a.m., he viewed eight more sexually explicit advertisements on Casual 
Encounters and Backpage, with titles such as “cuddle or whatever ‘w4m,’” “looking to feel used 
- w4m,” and “1 in a million hottest Latinas passion available now.”  (Id. at 1025-26).5  At 10:13 
a.m., he began watching another episode of Hogan’s Heroes, followed by another—his seventh 
of the day—at 10:42 a.m.  (Id. at 1026).  At 10:55 a.m., he returned to Craigslist to view 
                                                          
5 The abbreviation “w4m” stands for “women seeking men.”  United States v. Hinkel, 837 F.3d 111, 115 




additional sexual services advertisements.  (Id. at 1026-27).  At 10:56 a.m., he visited a website 
entitled “Job Listings in Massachusetts.”  (Id. at 1027).  At 11:23 a.m., he began watching an 
eighth episode of Hogan’s Heroes.  (Id.).  He streamed two additional episodes at 11:50 a.m. and 
at 1:35 p.m.  (Id.).  Thus, on September 22 alone, Federico watched a total of ten episodes of 
Hogan’s Heroes during work hours.  (Def. Ex. I-10).   
In addition to his internet activity, Federico also spent extensive time at work chatting by 
e-mail with a woman with whom he was having an extramarital affair.  (Def. Ex. G 23-25, H).  
Among other things, in an e-mail sent on Friday, September 19, he referred to Wiser as a “crazy 
women [sic].”  (Def. Ex. H 19).  The same day, he wrote that “THIS CUNT [Wiser] HERE IS 
PISSING ME OFF.”  (Def. Ex. H 16).    
The search of Federico’s work e-mail also revealed that on February 3, 2014, he sent an 
e-mail from his work e-mail address to his personal e-mail address that contained a link to what 
is apparently an advertisement for sexual services, with a sexually explicit subject line.  (Def. Ex. 
S).6  That e-mail was sent in contravention of the Town’s e-mail policy, which states that 
“[e]lectronic mail should never be used to create offensive . . . messages . . . .  Among those 
things which are considered offensive are any messages . . . which contain sexual 
implications . . . .”  (Def. SMF ¶ 76).   
After reviewing the computer records, the Water Department contacted the Rowley 
Police Department.  (Eagan Aff. ¶ 4).  On September 26, 2014, the Police Department began an 
investigation to determine whether Federico had solicited sexual services for a fee in violation of 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 53A while at work.  (Pl. Ex. 3 at 2).  The detective assigned to the 
case, Matthew Ziev, reviewed calls sent and received from Federico’s town-issued cellular 
                                                          




telephone, and e-mails sent and received from his work and personal e-mail addresses.  (Def. 
SMF ¶¶ 69, 71).  Detective Ziev found evidence that Federico had sent and received messages 
from sexual service providers using his personal e-mail during work hours, and made and 
received calls from such services using his town-issued cellular telephone.  (Pl. Ex. 3 3-9).7   
Ultimately, however, Detective Ziev determined that there was no probable cause to file a 
criminal complaint against Federico.  (Id. at 8-9).   
D. Plaintiff’s Application for FMLA Leave 
Federico contends that after leaving the Water Department, he began suffering from 
anxiety, depression, and panic attacks that caused his body temperature to fluctuate.  (Federico 
Dep. 154-56).  On October 6, 2014, Federico’s wife called Doreen Glowik, the Rowley Assistant 
Town Administrator, and requested materials for her husband to apply for leave under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act.  (Def. SMF ¶ 81).  The same day, Glowik sent a letter to 
Federico’s wife that contained the FMLA application form and other materials necessary for 
applying.  (Def. SMF ¶¶ 81, 89).  Federico—who was familiar with the process of applying for 
FMLA leave because of his prior employment in human resources at the Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation and because he had filed a lawsuit against that agency after he was 
terminated in which he alleged claims for FMLA interference and retaliation—testified that the 
Town provided him with all the paperwork necessary to apply for FMLA leave.  (Federico Dep. 
¶ 154, 179-80; Def. Ex. X Complaint and Jury Claim, Carmine Federico v. the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, C.A. No. 1:07-CV-11981-PBS  ¶¶87-93).8  
                                                          
7 Plaintiff objects to the admission of the police report on the basis that it is hearsay.  That report, however, 
is likely a public record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).  Even if it were hearsay, it could be considered for purposes 
other than the truth of the matter asserted (for example, that the Water Department was told the information 
contained in the report).  Furthermore, and in any event, plaintiff himself submitted the exhibit. 
 
8 Plaintiff has moved to strike this fact from the record as irrelevant.  However, Federico bases his claim, at 
least in part, on the fact that “Ms. Wiser made no attempt to inform [him] of [his] rights pursuant to the Family 
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On October 22, 2014, the Town received completed copies of Federico’s FMLA 
application materials and supporting medical documentation.  (Def. SMF ¶ 90).  On October 27, 
2014, the Rowley Town Administrator notified Federico that his request for FMLA leave had 
been approved, effective retroactively to September 23, 2014.  (Id. ¶ 92).  
Federico took twelve weeks of FMLA leave, up to December 16, 2014.  According to 
him, his health condition prevented him from returning to work.  (Federico Dep. 181).  On 
February 13, 2015, the Town extended an additional period of unpaid leave to Federico through 
February 20, 2015.  (Def. Ex. AA).  It is not clear from the record whether that additional leave 
was made retroactive to December 16, 2014.  
E. Federico’s Termination 
On February 26, 2015, Deborah Eagan, the Town Administrator, sent Federico a letter 
directing him to attend an investigatory interview.  (Def. Ex. BB).  Federico failed to attend the 
interview, although his attorney did.  (Eagan Aff. ¶¶ 20-21).  On March 9, 2015, Eagan sent 
another letter to Federico directing him to attend an additional investigatory interview scheduled 
for March 16, 2015.  (Def. Ex. DD).  Federico again failed to attend the interview, and again his 
attorney attended.  (Eagan Aff. ¶¶ 20-21).   
On May 19, 2015, the Town Board of Selectmen and Board of Water Commissioners 
held a joint meeting to discuss allegations of misconduct against Federico.  (Def. SMF ¶ 105).  
The Boards held another meeting on June 2, 2015, to continue the discussion.  (Id.).  On June 2, 
2015, the Boards voted that the charges of misconduct against Federico were sustained, and 
voted to terminate his employment.  (Id. ¶ 109).   
On June 3, 2015, the Town sent Federico a letter notifying him of the termination of his 
                                                          
Medical Leave Act.”  (Federico Aff. ¶26).  His former employment and his status as a repeat FMLA plaintiff are 
relevant to the issue of whether Wiser had to inform him of his FMLA rights, and will not be struck.  
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employment.  (Def. Ex. FF).  The letter stated that Federico was being terminated for the 
following reasons: 
 Neglect of duty – Failing to generate certain minutes of the Water 
Commission’s meetings as directed by your supervisor and engaging in 
excessive non-work activities during work hours such as watching episodes 
of Hogan’s Heroes on YouTube, engaging in other non-work related 
computer activity and making/receiving numerous extended personal 
telephone calls; 
 
 Conduct unbecoming an employee – utilizing the Town’s computer system to 
view websites offering illicit and other sexual services and using the Town’s 
computer system and Town issued cell phone to respond to and communicate 
with some of the individuals who advertised their services on such sites; and 
 
 Insubordination – Failing and refusing to comply with the Town 
Administrator’s directives to attend investigatory interviews that were 
scheduled to discuss the allegations above on two separate occasions. 
 
(Id.).  
II. Procedural Background 
On April 17, 2015, Federico filed this lawsuit in Essex Superior Court.  The complaint 
alleged five claims against both defendants for (1) interference with plaintiff’s rights under the 
federal Family and Medical Leave Act; (2) retaliation under the federal Family and Medical 
Leave Act; (3) interference with plaintiff’s rights under the Massachusetts Small Necessities 
Leave Act; (4) retaliation under the Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act; and (5) invasion 
of privacy. 
On June 17, 2015, defendants removed the action to this court.  Defendants have now 
moved for summary judgment as to all five claims.  
III. Analysis 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment 
The role of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order 
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to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”  Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 
822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990)).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine issue is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, 
viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant . . . would permit a rational fact finder to 
resolve the issue in favor of either party.”  Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 
F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court 
indulges all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  See O'Connor v. Steeves, 
994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).  When “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is 
made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quotations omitted).  The non-
moving party may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,” but instead 
must “present affirmative evidence.”  Id. at 256-57. 
1. Counts One and Two:  Family and Medical Leave Act Claims 
The federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., provides employees 
with certain rights to take medical leave and other personal leave.  See Hodgens v. General 
Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1998).  Plaintiff claims two separate violations 
of the FMLA by both defendants:  an “interference” claim and a “retaliation” claim.  Both claims 
are brought under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a), which makes it unlawful for any employer to “interfere 
with, restrain, or deny the exercise or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the 
FMLA].”  Although the language of the statute is not explicit with respect to retaliation, 
employers are “prohibited from discriminating against employees . . . who have used FMLA 
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leave.”  Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160 n. 4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)).  
a. Interference 
Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to leave under the FMLA after he left work on 
September 23, 2014, and that defendants interfered with that right.  In order to establish a prima 
facie case for FMLA interference, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was eligible for the protection 
of FMLA; (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under the 
FMLA; (4) he gave his employer notice of his intention to take leave; and (5) his employer 
denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.  See Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de 
Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 722 n. 8 (1st Cir. 2014).  
Plaintiff’s claim for interference fails because he has not produced evidence that he was 
denied any FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.  To the contrary, he testified that he 
received all materials necessary to apply for FMLA leave, and acknowledges that he was granted 
leave on October 27, which was provided retroactively, effective on September 23.  When, at the 
end of the twelve weeks of leave to which he was entitled under FMLA, he felt that he was still 
unable to return to work, he received an additional period of unpaid leave.  He has not provided 
any evidence to support his claim that defendants interfered with his rights under the FMLA.  
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count One will therefore be granted. 
b. Retaliation 
Plaintiff further contends that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his rights 
under the FMLA.  A prima facie case of FMLA retaliation requires a plaintiff to prove that (1) 
he availed himself of a protected FMLA right; (2) he was “adversely affected by an employment 
decision;” and (3) “there was a causal connection between [his] protected conduct and the 
adverse employment action.”  Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Quimica P.R., Inc., 447 
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F.3d 105, 113-14 (1st Cir. 2006).  A key difference in required proof between an interference 
claim and a retaliation claim is causation:  a retaliation claim requires an allegation (and, 
ultimately, proof) of a retaliatory motive on the part of the employer, but motive is generally 
irrelevant to an interference claim.  See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60.   
Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of retaliation, the court must employ the 
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).  See Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 335 (1st Cir. 
2005).  Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful 
retaliation.  Id at 336.  Once the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.  Id.  If the employer 
articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's 
stated reason for the adverse action was in fact a pretext for retaliation.  Id. 
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff has established the first two prongs of the test for a 
prima facie case—namely, that he availed himself of a FMLA right when he applied for leave in 
October 2014, which was granted, and that he suffered an adverse employment action when he 
was terminated in June 2015.  The question is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether plaintiff’s exercise of his FMLA rights caused his termination. 
In general, a plaintiff’s burden to show that an adverse employment action occurred 
because of the exercise of FMLA rights is “quite easy to meet.”  Id. at 165-66 (quoting 
Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127 (1st Cir.1991)).  Here, plaintiff relies on two 
pieces of evidence in support of his claim.   
First, he contends that Wiser’s attitude toward him changed after he took the day off of 
work to care for his mother on September 2.  To qualify for FMLA leave, an employee must 
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have been employed for at least twelve months.  29 U.S.C § 2611(2)(A)(i).  Plaintiff began 
working at the Rowley Water Department on September 23, 2013.  Exactly twelve months later, 
on September 23, 2014, he left work, only later asserting his right to take leave under the FMLA.  
His ability to take leave on September 2 was not protected by the FMLA, because he was 
ineligible for the protection of the statute at that time.  As a result, Wiser’s alleged change in 
attitude the next day cannot constitute retaliation for the exercise of a protected right.  Plaintiff, 
however, contends that her changed attitude is evidence of an intent to retaliate against him for 
taking leave once he was eligible for such leave.   
Second, plaintiff contends that the fact that his termination followed immediately after he 
took leave under the FMLA demonstrates retaliatory intent.  He left work on September 23, 
2014, and the Water Department began investigating his internet use the following day.  That 
investigation began a chain of events that ultimately led to his termination.   
Based on those two pieces of evidence, plaintiff has—just barely—established a prima 
facie case for retaliation.  See Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc., 673 F.3d 
1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that evidence of “temporal proximity” between employee’s action 
and the allegedly retaliatory adverse employment action helps establish causation prong); 
Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 25 (finding that “sufficient temporal proximity between the protected 
conduct and the employment action . . . [makes] out a prima facie case”); but see Wright v. 
CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that “chronological proximity does 
not by itself establish causality”).9   
                                                          
9 The close proximity between the time that plaintiff left work and the initiation of the investigation weighs 
less strongly in plaintiff’s favor than it might under other circumstances.  Here, plaintiff left the office on September 
23, 2014, after Wiser voiced multiple complaints about his work practices.  In fact, he left work directly following a 
meeting that was called for the purpose of discussing problems with his performance.  He did not actually apply for 
FMLA leave until October 22, 2014, one month later.  The fact that his termination followed the exercise of his 
FMLA rights helps establish a prima facie case, but is not strong evidence of an intent to retaliate under the 
circumstances.   
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Because plaintiff has made such a showing, the burden shifts to defendants to offer a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination.  Wright, 352 F.3d at 478.  Here, defendants 
contend that plaintiff was terminated for the reasons communicated in his termination notice, 
namely (1) neglect of duty, based on the hours plaintiff spent watching Hogan’s Heroes, 
engaging in other non-work related computer activity, and making personal phone calls during 
work hours; (2) conduct unbecoming an employee, based on the advertisements for sexual 
services he viewed during work, and the messages for such services he sent and received using 
his town-issued cellular telephone and e-mail address; and (3) insubordination, based on his 
failure to comply with the Town Administrator’s directives to attend investigatory interviews.  
Those stated reasons unquestionably constitute legitimate reasons for the termination. 
The burden then shifts to plaintiff to offer proof that these reasons were “in fact a pretext 
for retaliating against him for having taken FMLA leave.”  Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 161.  Plaintiff 
does not dispute the facts underlying the charges made against him.  Instead, he contends that it 
was unfair for the Town to base its decision, in part, on the fact that he did not attend the 
investigatory interviews at a time when he believed he was under criminal investigation.  Even if 
true, that is not evidence of pretext.  Furthermore, and in any event, defendants have offered 
overwhelming evidence—none of which is controverted—that plaintiff spent virtually all day, 
every day watching television and viewing sexual services advertisements instead of performing 
his work.  Plaintiff admits those allegations, and offers no affirmative evidence that defendants’ 
stated reasons are merely a pretext for their true retaliatory intent.  Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment as to Count Two will accordingly be granted. 
2. Counts Three and Four:  Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act 
Claims 
 
The Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act (SNLA) allows eligible employees to 
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take 24 hours of leave during any twelve-month period for the purpose of participating in school 
activities or accompanying children and elderly relatives to healthcare appointments.  See Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 52D(b).  The leave available to employees under the SNLA supplements 
the leave available under the FMLA.  See id.  The SNLA also explicitly incorporates FMLA 
provisions, including those related to eligibility, specifically including the requirement that an 
employee have been employed for at least twelve months before becoming eligible for SNLA 
leave.  See id. § 52D(c); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i). 
Plaintiff began work with the Rowley Water Department on September 23, 2013.  He 
contends that he took leave on September 2, 2014, pursuant to the SNLA, in order to accompany 
his mother to medical appointments.  However, he was not eligible for SNLA leave as of that 
date, because he had admittedly not been employed by the Water Department for at least twelve 
months by the date the leave was taken.  Furthermore, the September 2 leave did not involve a 
school activity, and he did not take his mother to a medical appointment.  Therefore, defendants 
cannot be held liable for interfering with or retaliating against plaintiff’s right to take leave 
pursuant to the SNLA, because plaintiff had no such right.10  Accordingly, defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment as to Counts Three and Four will be granted.   
3. Count Five:  Invasion of Privacy 
Generously construed, the complaint alleges a claim for invasion of privacy under the 
Massachusetts Privacy Act.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B.11  The Act provides, in relevant 
                                                          
10 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff conceded that Federico was not eligible for SNLA leave as of 
September 2, 2014.   
 
11 The complaint alleges what is apparently a claim for the common-law tort of invasion of privacy in 
Count Five.  (Compl. ¶53-58).  Massachusetts has never recognized a common-law cause of action for invasion of 
privacy.  See Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 70 (Mass. 1985).  The Court will accordingly review Count Five 
pursuant to the Massachusetts statute governing invasion of privacy claims.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B.  
Although the Court construes claims in the complaint liberally, plaintiff must at least “give the defendant fair notice 
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds of support upon which it rests.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
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part, that “[a] person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference 
with his privacy.”   That part of the statute protects employees from disclosing facts of a “highly 
personal or intimate nature when there exists no legitimate, countervailing interest.”  Bratt v. Int'l 
Bus. Machines Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518 (1984).  The Act is most frequently invoked in cases 
where the plaintiff alleges public disclosure of private facts, but a plaintiff may also claim 
unreasonable intrusion “upon the plaintiff's ‘solitude’ or ‘seclusion.’” Polay v. McMahon, 468 
Mass. 379, 382 (2014) (quoting Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 408 n. 16 
(2005). 
Notwithstanding the statute's use of the disjunctive term “or,” courts interpreting the Act 
have determined that “[t]he intrusion must be both unreasonable, as well as either substantial or 
serious.”  Walker v. Jackson, 952 F. Supp. 2d 343, 353 (D. Mass. 2013).  See Polay 468 Mass. at 
383.  The Privacy Act “was not intended to prohibit serious or substantial interferences which are 
reasonable or justified.”  See Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 
Mass. 514, 518 (1991).  Generally, whether an intrusion satisfies this standard constitutes a 
question of fact.  See Polay 468 Mass. at 383.  Factors to be considered in assessing whether 
there has been an intrusion that is unreasonable and substantial or serious, include “the location 
of the intrusion, the means used, the frequency and duration of the intrusion, and the underlying 
purpose behind the intrusion.”  Id.   
a. Town of Rowley 
Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy as to the Town of Rowley fails as a matter of 
law.  Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, municipalities cannot be held liable for the 
                                                          
544, 545 (2007).  In briefing and at oral argument, plaintiff asserted claims under the Fourth Amendment related to 
the invasion of privacy claim.  However, plaintiff has not alleged a Fourth Amendment claim, and the Court does 
not construe Count Five to encompass one.  
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intentional torts of their employees.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10.  Specifically, under the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, “public employers, but not their employees, are immunized from 
suit for intentional torts including invasion of privacy.”  Tivnan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 
50 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 102 (2000) (citing Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 
286 n. 9 (1985)).  Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Five will be 
granted as to the Town. 
b. Wiser 
Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy as to defendant Wiser similarly fails.  To 
establish a claim for public disclosure of private facts, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
has not only obtained information, but has also disclosed it.  See Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic 
Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 1988).  Plaintiff contends that Wiser rummaged through his 
briefcase and took photographs of its contents.  Wiser contests this characterization, admitting 
that that she took photographs of work-related materials contained in his open briefcase, but 
denying that she opened the briefcase or examined any of its contents.  Although Wiser admits 
that she took photographs of papers contained in his briefcase, she contends (and plaintiff does 
not dispute) that she never displayed those photographs to anyone.  Thus, plaintiff has not 
provided evidence to create a genuine issue that Wiser disclosed private facts to anyone. 
Furthermore, plaintiff cannot establish a claim for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion 
because he has not put forth any evidence to show that the claimed intrusion was both (1) 
unreasonable and (2) substantial or serious.  See Polay 468 Mass. at 383.  The alleged intrusion 
occurred at plaintiff’s place of work, during the brief period that he stepped out of the office to 
use the restroom and clock in.  Plaintiff does not allege that Wiser’s actions were part of an 
ongoing pattern of invasion or harassment.  See Schlesinger, 409 Mass. at 519.  Although Wiser 
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used a camera to take photographs of the briefcase’s contents, that did not constitute an 
unreasonable intrusion into plaintiff’s seclusion; Wiser has consistently stated that she only 
captured photographs of work-related documents, and plaintiff has not produced any contrary 
evidence.  Cf. Polay, 468 Mass. at 384 (finding defendants’ use of film cameras exacerbate 
intrusiveness).  In addition, all of the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Wiser 
sought the information to determine whether plaintiff was taking work home in defiance of her 
orders.  Under the circumstances, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Wiser’s actions 
did not constitute an unreasonable and substantial or serious intrusion upon plaintiff’s seclusion.  
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Five will be granted as to 
defendant Wiser. 
IV. Conclusion 




       /s/ F. Dennis Saylor               
       F. Dennis Saylor IV 
Dated: December 7, 2016    United States District Judge   
 
